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Introduction 
We fill a gap in the literature on empirical measures of protectionism of nontariff measures 
(NTMs) by proposing simple yet formal aggregation indices of NTMs. The indices measure the 
protectionism of Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) standards relative to science-based criteria 
embodied in international standards such as Codex Alimentarius. MRLs set limits on harmful 
substances, like pesticide residues, veterinary drug residues, and other harmful substances, that 
importing countries allow on similar imported and domestic products as implied by national 
treatment. MRLs are often substance, product, and country specific. Countries have a legitimate 
right to set science-based MRLs in presence of harmful risk. MRLs can also be used to impede 
trade to protect domestic producers rather than protecting health or the environment.  
We link two streams of the NTMs literature, each addressing a specific problem. These 
two problems have been vexing and remain largely unresolved. One stream is concerned with the 
aggregation of various NTMs into meaningful indices, to characterize NTM regimes and to be 
used in econometric analyses of trade flows or to model and analyze policy impact (Disdier, 
Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008)). The other stream attempts to evaluate the protectionist nature of 
NTMs. Unlike tariffs for which the presumption is that they distort trade and welfare, NTMs 
may improve welfare (improvement in economic allocation of resources) because they address 
some market imperfection (Beghin et al. (2012)). So quantification, aggregation, and delineation 
of the potential protectionism of NTMs are a complex and important issue in the analysis of 
NTMs. 
Empirical studies of NTMs almost inevitably involve quantification and aggregation of 
several policies. Unlike tariffs, a single policy type whose numerical values can be directly used 
and interpreted, NTMs cover a lot of intrinsically different policies. For example, a Multi-
Agency Support Team (MAST) of international organizations proposed a classification of 
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NTMs, which consists of 16 major categories, including Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), other technical measures, price control measures, 
quantity control measures, etc. These NTMs can be qualitative and/or quantitative standards. For 
qualitative standards, like labeling, no numerical values can be directly used. Further, these 
qualitative policies affect different components of cost of production and marketing and cannot 
be easily aggregated into a single price equivalent. Evaluating the protectionist component of 
these numerous qualitative policies into a protectionist score is likely to remain a challenge. For 
quantitative NTM policies, we show that aggregation is a much more manageable task 
Individual NTMs have been used empirically in a disaggregated fashion (Disdier and 
Marette (2010); Wilson and Otsuki (2004)). For qualitative standards, dummies are usually used 
to indicate the existence of such a standard. For quantitative standards, like Maximum Residue 
Limits (MRLs), the numerical levels may be directly used in the model (Xiong and Beghin 
(2012)). However, a single disaggregated NTM has limited application. Usually, a myriad of 
standards work together to regulate the quality of a product, and picking just one of the NTMs 
may lead to subjective selection bias and a mischaracterization of the set of NTMs regulating the 
market under study. In addition, even if there is no bias, a single NTM is not exhaustive and may 
not be representative. 
 Based on that concern, researchers often aggregate regulations and standards in summary 
indicators (Winchester et al., 2012). Indices involve aggregating over different regulations and 
standards, like labeling and MRL, and/or aggregating over products of different importance. 
Indices have their own drawbacks, especially when they aggregate heterogeneous policies. Their 
interpretation may be difficult. The estimated impact of the index on trade cannot be traced back 
to a particular instrument type or policy and policy prescriptions are infeasible. Recent 
investigations focus on measuring the heterogeneity of NTMs regimes across countries and 
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products. Kox and Lejour (2006) propose an index based on a binary indicator of NTMs 
similarity. Rau, Shutes, and Sclueter (2010) developed a heterogeneity index of trade (HIT) of 
NTMs that can be applied to binary, ordered, or quantitative NTMs. The HIT is non-directional 
which means it measures the bilateral dissimilarity of NTMs, but gives no information about the 
relative strictness of NTMs. This is a drawback as countries could be dissimilar by being more or 
less stringent and because the relative regulatory environment could be different (lax or stringent 
environments presumably easy or rather difficult to meet as it is increasing costly to meet 
stringency at the margin). Winchester et al. (2012) extend the HIT, to a directional HIT (DHIT) 
capturing the asymmetric stringency between two countries and apply it to MRL data in an 
investigation of bilateral trade of agricultural products. This is an improvement over the HIT as 
trade presumably flow more easily from more stringent locations to less stringent destinations 
rather than the opposite. Still the drawback about the relative lax or stringent regulatory 
environments remains; a difference of 5ppm around a 50ppm MRL is different from a 5 ppm 
difference around a 10ppm MRL for a similar substance. Vigani, Raimondi, and Opler (2009), 
Drogué and DeMaria (2012), and Achterbosch et al. (2009) offer alternative scalar summary 
measures of dissimilarity of policies which still present either or both of these drawbacks. 
 An alternative to these heterogeneity indices, the frequency ratio is often used (Harrigan 
(1993); Fontagné, Mimouni, and Pasteels (2005); and Disdier, Fontagné, Mimouni (2008)). It 
calculates the coverage of NTMs of product categories relative to the total number of product 
categories of at aggregated level (say HS4 or HS2 digit) and weighted by production levels. 
Other aggregate or summary count proxies exist to provide an aggregate characterization of 
NTM regimes. These proxies do not provide much information on the stringency of NTM 
regimes (numerous lax NTMs, by count or frequencies, can be seen as more stringent than as a 
few exacting NTMs). See Li and Beghin (2012) for a systematic review of various NTM proxies 
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and aggregators used in econometric investigations. 
Traditionally many NTMs investigations have assumed NTMs impede trade (and 
implicitly decrease welfare) and rule out trade or welfare enhancing effects. However, it is 
increasingly recognized that market imperfections such as asymmetric information and 
production and consumption externalities abound and NTM policy interventions could increase 
welfare and may be trade-impeding or trade enhancing while increasing welfare (Beghin et al. 
2012, Carrère and De Melo, 2011; Disdier et al, 2008; and Disdier and Marette, 2010). NTMs 
may also be protectionist of course. Nevertheless, some agnostic priors on their protectionist 
nature ought to prevail. The empirical literature actually shows numerous cases of trade-
enhancing NTMs (see Li and Beghin (2012) for a systematic review of that literature). There is 
no simple mapping between NTMs, their stringency, and their trade and welfare effects in 
presence of market imperfections.  
To complicate further, market imperfections may justify some NTMs but do not exclude 
protectionism because the level of the chosen measure may be overly stringent, hence, 
protectionist by creating unnecessary frictions in trade. This is an increasing preoccupation in 
policy forums (Disdier and van Tongeren (2010)). Several investigations correlate frequency and 
trade frictions, without formalizing what is protectionism. For example, Disdier and van 
Tongeren (2010) make the conjecture that protectionism is responsible for some variance of 
incidence of NTMs across agri-food products. Disdier, Fontagné, Mimouni (2008) posit that 
protectionism may exist when a SPS measure is enforced by only a few countries. Not looking 
explicitly at protectionism but rather at trade frictions, Winchester et al. (2012) investigate how 
bilateral stringency differences in NTMs affect bilateral trade. Reducing stringency differences 
to common lower stringency levels would increase trade; the welfare (allocative efficiency) 
grounds to do so are less clear, unless protectionism is presumed to prevail in the most stringent 
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countries. These “conjectures” are intuitive, but lack formalism which we attempt to provide 
here. 
Formalizing protectionism 
When defining protectionism of NTMs one can start with the simple science-based test. In 
absence of scientific evidence establishing market imperfections or risk, a NTM is protectionist.1 
In presence of established risk or imperfections, identifying protectionism is more cumbersome.  
More conceptually, Fischer and Serra (2000) provide a formal criterion for gauging 
protectionism in presence of market imperfection. They conceptually analyze the protectionism 
behavior of a local social planner (LSP) setting up a quality standard to lower a negative 
consumption externality. The authors define a standard as protectionist if its optimum level is 
higher under a local LSP than under a global social planner treating all firms competing for the 
domestic market (foreign and domestic firms) as purely domestic. They find that when there a 
negative consumption externality the LSP always set the optimum domestic standard at a higher 
(protectionist) level than the level chosen by the global planner. The argument would be valid for 
a negative production externality as well. The Fisher and Serra results hinge on the domestic 
firms being more efficient at meeting the quality standard than foreign firms are. Marette and 
Beghin (2010) show that if foreign firms are much more efficient at meeting the standard, the 
domestic LSP will choose an anti-protectionist standard, lower than the global standard. Berti 
and Falvey (2009) extend the analysis of Fisher and Serra and incorporate rent seeking industries 
influencing the way the LSP sets standards. They investigate how rent-seeking and socially 
optimum standards vary from autarky to free trade. Rent-seeking under free trade between two 
countries promotes the harmonization of standards that were heterogeneous under autarky. 
Finally, earlier on, Baldwin (1970) defines a NTM as protectionist whenever it lowers global real 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There is a caveat of the precautionary principle which lets a country introduce a NTM while establishing the 
science. A precautionary policy without the pursuit of evidence is protectionist according to the WTO. 
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income. The latter criteria could conceptually accommodate cases with market imperfections.  
These conceptual efforts provide clear definitions of protectionism. However, they are 
difficult to operationalize in realistic empirical applications when many NTMs are imposed at 
once and because informational requirements are extensive. The issue of an aggregator lurks 
again in presence of many NTMs. Further, the Fisher and Serra criterion is not directly 
applicable when the supply is only made of foreign firms as in the case of tropical exports to 
most of the Northern hemisphere (e.g., the EU peanut market). The Baldwin criterion is also 
difficult to implement in real empirical cases given the “world” dimension of the criteria. 
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) does not set standards but strongly encourages 
countries to use internationally accepted science-based standards, like Codex Alimentarius 
standards whenever available.2 However, the WTO allows its members to set their own standards 
away from international ones, as long as their individual standards are science based, non-
discriminating, and least trade restrictive (WTO Doha Ministerial (2001)). The issue of 
“appropriate level of protection” is still under discussion, and the WTO has not yet 
disambiguated what this means practically. Yet the science-based argument is a corner stone to 
fight protectionism and has led to several ruling by the WTO against policies in the EU, Japan, 
and Australia which could not be justified using scientific evidence (see WTO dispute cases 
DS245, DS367, and DS26). 
In the next section, we propose indices of NTM protectionism based on the departure of 
their stringency from that of international science-based standards. We consider MRL measures, 
which are quantitative standards and give us a basis for comparison and aggregation. We use the 
Codex Alimentarius MRL standards as the non-protectionist science-based reference level. 
MRLs that exceed Codex levels are defined to be protectionist or “excessively stringent” beyond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2The WTO's SPS Agreement says“to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, 
Members shall base their SPS measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations”. The Agreement  
names Codex as the standard-setting organization for food safety.   
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international norms, a simple criterion. It extends naturally from the WTO recommendation to 
use international standards. We also limit our analysis to science-based situations for each of 
which an international standard exists.  
 
Defining Protectionism Indices 
Different aggregation levels have specific purposes. A measure of the protectionism for a given 
importer and given good provides detailed information for importers by commodity. This 
aggregator is useful for cross section (goods and countries) econometric investigations. It can be 
used in gravity equations to characterize the SPS policy regime, along with tariffs and farm 
subsidies and econometrically estimate the impact of these policies on detailed sectoral trade. 
These commodity- in-country scores are the building blocks of the other two aggregation scores, 
aggregating over countries to establish an average protectionist score per commodity or 
aggregating over all considered goods by country to establish country protectionism in these SPS 
regulations. These country aggregate indices allow us to assess and rank countries by their 
relative MRL protectionism. These indices could also be compared to summary protection 
measures via tariffs and farm subsidies to analyze the policy composition of protectionism. 
We define an importer’s MRL to be protectionist when its stringency exceeds the 
corresponding science-based international MRL. If an importer’s MRL is higher than the 
corresponding international MRL, then we deem the MRL non-protectionist. The aggregation 
over a multitude of substances (and goods) provides robustness to the indices. An “unintended” 
accidental protectionist MRL will be swamped by other non-protectionist MRLs included in the 
three indices proposed below if a country is mostly non-protectionist. 
 Define
( )jijk
M the maximum residue level of importer i, for good j, and harmful 
substance ( )jk ; and let ( ), jintl jkM be the international maximum residue level for the same good and 
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harmful substance. Denote total number of importers as I, total number of goods as J, and total 
number of chemical/pesticides applied to product j as ( )jK . To each of the three aggregations 
stated above, we propose the following indices, the commodity-in-country index Sij, country 
index Si, and product index Sj: 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
1( ) ,
1= ( exp( ))
j
j j
j j
K
intl jk ijk
ij
kj intl jk
M M
S
K M=
−
∑ , (1) 
( )
( )
( )
, ( )
1 1 1( ) ,
1= ( exp( ))
j
j
j
KJ J
intl jk j ijk
i ij
j k jj intl jk
M M
S w
K M= = =
−
×∑∑ ∑ ,  (2) 
and 
( )
( )
( )
, ( )
1 1 1( ) ,
1 '( exp( ))
j
j
j
KI J
intl jk j ijk
j ij
i k jj intl jk
M M
S w
K M= = =
−
= ×∑∑ ∑ , (3) 
where ijw is the weight assigned to product j  when we aggregate over products for given 
country i in country index Si. Ideally, weights should reflect the dead-weight loss associated with 
each product in aggregation over products for a given country. However, dead-weight loss data 
are not readily available, and we consider 3 alternatives to mitigate this issue. First, we use 
unweighted scores (all weights are equal fractions summing up to unity). These equal weights 
have the interesting property that they provide country and commodity rankings identical to 
those obtained by using world-average trade weights to all countries. Second, we use import 
value as the basis of the weights wij. Third and last, we consider neighboring countries’ trade 
weights to avoid the potential bias which could exists if some stringent MRL choke trade in a 
given country. Neighboring countries have their own policies and their trade patterns.  
The country weight 'ijw  is the weight assigned to country iwhen we aggregate over 
countries for given product j to obtain total protection in that product with product index Sj. 
More specifically, for the trade based indices we have 
1
ij
Jij
ij
j
IMw
IM
=
=
∑
 and 
1
' ij
Iij
ij
i
IMw
IM
=
=
∑
, 
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where ijIM is the import value of country i  (or its neighbors) for total trade of product j . As 
shown, the weights are normalized to sum up to one. Below, we refer to the traded scores based 
on own trade values as “trade-weighted” and we refer to the unweighted scores as “equally-
weighted” or “unweighted.” We refer to neighbor-weighted scores when we use neighbors’ trade 
weights to establish scores. 
To summarize, index ijS  measures the protectionism of the MRLs for a given product and 
importer, aggregating over hazardous substances; iS  measures the protectionism of MRLs for a 
given importer, aggregating over substances and products; and jS  measures the protectionism of 
MRLs for a given product, aggregating over substances and importers. 
Properties of the indices 
By design, the indices have the following properties. They are unit free and invariant to scale 
since they tally and aggregate deviations in MRL in relative terms (%).  The units used for MRLs 
are irrelevant as long as Codex MRL and the MRL in question are in the same units. Increasing 
marginal difficulty of attaining stricter standards (convexity in protectionism) is also imposed by 
using exponential weights. That is the cost of stringency beyond Codex increases at an 
increasing rate. We also have invariance to regulation intensity, monotonicity (non-decreasing in 
MRL stringency of different countries, same product and same harmful substance, other things 
equal), and lower and upper bounded. 
  First, we subtract the importer’s MRL from the international MRL, because, by the 
definition of protectionism, only the part of the importer’s MRL that is more stringent than the 
international MRL contributes to protectionism. When the MRL is laxer than the international 
standard, it is anti-protectionist. MRLs have different scales, which could vary from 0.01 
ppm(parts per million) to 10ppm or more. To make the index invariant to the scale of different 
residue levels, we scale the differences between importer and international MRLs by the 
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international MRL. Second, the lower (i.e, stricter) the standard the harder it is for exporters to 
achieve. For example, some importers may relax all but one MRL above the international 
accepted level. But the one stringent MRL may become tough to achieve. By taking the 
exponential of the protectionism contributing part of the MRL, we put more weight on the MRLs 
that are relatively more stringent.  
Third, the number of substances regulated varies by products in many cases. In our 
application, this number of substances ranges from over a hundred to below 10. For example, the 
United States has established 107 pesticide MRLs for apples, and only 7 pesticide MRLs for 
coconut. The different regulatory intensity is possibly due the heterogeneous popularity of 
products with consumers. By averaging the sum of protectionism scores of each pesticide by the 
total number of pesticides, we make the protectionism indices invariant the regulation intensity. 
This property is further analyzed later in the paper as the regulatory intensity may be confounded 
with some missing data issue.  
Last, the indices are non-decreasing in stringency (
( )jijk
M getting smaller) for different 
countries given the same j, ( )jk and all other things being equal. If a country’s standard is more 
stringent, its protectionist scores will be nondecreasing in that stringency. Note that the scores 
are bounded by 0 (“infinite” MRL) at the lower bound and 2.72e ≈ at the upper bound (zero 
MRL). A score of 1 indicate a non-protectionist policy (MRL at the Codex MRL). Scores larger 
than 1 indicate “protectionism” of policies as MRLs are more stringent than Codex on average, 
and scores below 1 indicate the “anti-protectionism,” of policies as MRLs are laxer than Codex 
on average.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In an earlier version, we truncated the indices below at 1 by constraining MRLs to have a score of 1 if they are not 
protectionist, including anti-protectionist MRLs. This truncation precludes having high and low scores offsetting 
each other. However, because we observed little offsetting in the data, we did removed the truncation. Avoiding 
truncation allows for anti-protectionism and provides a better measure of the variation in scores within a given 
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Application and Data Description  
 The MRL data used here are publicly available and come from the USDA FAS International 
MRL database (http://www.mrldatabase.com/) accessed on line in March 2012 (after a 
substantial update). The database consists of pesticide MRLs and veterinary drug MRLs. 
Pesticide and veterinary drug MRLs are maintained in two separate databases and their data 
structures are different. We discuss the pesticide MRLs database first. We note that this database 
has large overlaps with the Homologa database maintained by the UK Department For 
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs. 
The pesticide MRLs database covers 341 products (Table 1), 19,486 (product by 
pesticide) pairs, and 83 countries, and has 1,617,338 records. Among the 83 countries covered by 
the pesticide MRLs database, 29 countries completely comply with Codex standards; 18 
countries comply with EU standards; 7 countries defer to exporting countries standards; 5 
countries comply with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) standards; and Mexico adopted U.S. 
standards. Finally, 22 out of 83 countries set their own standards only or partially combined with 
Codex or EU standards.  
Table 1: Product categories in the pesticide database  
Category Count 
Grains & Oilseeds 14 
Poultry & Eggs 6 
Dairy 2 
Horticultural & Tropical 
Products 
313 
Animal Products 15 
 
Pesticide MRL data issues and remedial steps 
This rich database has several shortcomings which we address as follows. First, there is some 
redundancy in the listed products (different names for a similar good or several names into a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
index, but allows for protectionism and anti-protectionism offsetting each other within the index. The latter would 
be reflected in a large variance for the index. 
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broad category). When we aggregate over products to calculate country-level protectionism 
indices, redundancy causes larger influence for the redundant products. Exact redundancy 
(several names for a commodity) is manually detected and deleted. Redundancy by commodity 
grouping is a bit more complicate (e.g., Beans with Bean Dry, Broad Bean Dry, Mung Bean, 
kidney Bean, and Lima Bean when Beans include Broad Beans, Mung Beans etc). Some 
countries specify their MRLs for specific kinds of beans (“Mung Mean”,” Pink Bean”), but some 
other countries just specify MRL for "Beans" in general. We keep the redundant products of this 
kind, in order to make the product list consistent and comparable across countries but with the 
caveat in mind.  
 A second concern is that the MRL database only lists chemicals that are available to U.S. 
farmers. This problem also applies to the veterinary drug database. A foreign MRL for a product 
or chemical is only included in the database if there is a U.S. MRL for that product or chemical. 
Hence, the foreign country could be regulating other residues but we do not know for which 
chemical and the corresponding MRLs. This concern is limited because the U.S list is the most 
comprehensive list of chemicals across all countries. In addition, we compared the chemical list 
in the USDA data and that of Homologa  (for 2008) from the UK Department for Environment, 
Foood, and Rural Affairs and the two lists are comparable, especially for chemicals for which 
Codex has an established MRLs. USDA has a slightly longer list, probably because of the more 
recent reference year. So we believe this concern is manageable. 
The third problem with the database resides with non-established MRLs. This problem 
also applies to the veterinary drug database. Usually, the default MRLs defined by countries may 
apply when no MRLs are established. But there are rare cases when chemicals are exempt or 
banned. Since the database only includes the chemicals that the United States has positively 
listed and because Codex has also regulated residues for this substance, it is unlikely that these 
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substances are considered exempt by other countries since both Codex and the US regulate them. 
In addition, it is difficult to find lists of banned chemicals maintained by other countries. We 
have no further information to distinguish when a  non-established MRL means default, exempt, 
banned, or missing data. Because the exempt and banned cases are rare, we substitute non-
established MRLs with individual country’s default MRLs (see table 2). Missing data remain a 
concern. The USDA database was extensively updated in 2012 after its initial (2010) release 
with many non-established data being eventually updated by actual MRLs. Missing data have 
been greatly reduced.  
Table 2: Default Values for non-established Pesticide MRLs 
 
The Veterinary database 
The original veterinary drug database covers 7 product groups (hogs, chickens, turkeys, sheep, 
cattle, milk, and eggs), 19 countries and/regions and international standards (Codex) and 
contains 8,820 records. The non-established MRLs are substituted with default values (table 3). 
However, for Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, we did not 
find their default veterinary drug MRLs. So we deleted the non-established MRLs from these 
countries. Since Chile and Indonesia only have non-established veterinary drug MRLs shown in 
the database, all of their veterinary drug MRLs are deleted unfortunately.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The veterinary drug default for South Africa is 0.05ppm 
5 We did not find the default MRL for Turkey, but assumed it to be EU MRLs. 
Default values for 
non established 
Pesticide MRLs 
Countries Number of 
Countries 
0 ppm Australia, Taiwan 2 
0.01ppm European Union, Norway, Malaysia, South Africa4, 
Japan, Argentina 
5 
0.1ppm Canada 1 
Codex Chile, China, Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), 
Indonesia, India, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, 
Brazil, Russia, New Zealand, United Arab Emirates 
12 
EU Switzerland, Turkey5 2 
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Unlike the pesticide MRLs database, which is a balanced country by (product and 
pesticide) panel data set, the veterinary data are unbalanced. Products and the veterinary drugs 
associated are different for different countries. To combine pesticide MRLs with veterinary drug 
MRLs, we matched the products based on the pesticide database. Due to the incompleteness of 
the second dataset, at the commodity level, veterinary drugs are included for some countries but 
not for other countries.  
Table 3: Default Values for Non-established Veterinary Drug MRLs 
Default Values for Non-
established Veterinary 
Drug MRLs 
Countries 
0.01ppm Japan 
0 ppm Australia, Canada, European Union, United States, 
Taiwan, Norway 
Codex Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Peru, Philippines, Venezuela,  
Unknown Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Vietnam 
 
The products covered by the MRL databases are manually mapped into 6-digit or 4-digit 
Harmonized System classification (HS) (table available upon request). The mapping between the 
products listed in the MRL database and HS is not bijective. Correspondences exist both ways. 
One product could be mapped into multiple 6-digit HS code, and one 6-digit HS code could be 
mapped with more than one product in the MRL database, given that some products are very 
specific and others are broadly defined. Given the HS 6 or HS 4 digits codes, we compile the 
trade data from the United Nations Comtrade database. Trade weights, which are used in 
calculating trade weighted indices, are the average of trade values for all products falling under 
the same HS 6-digit (or 4-digit) category if more than one product are mapped to one HS 6-digit 
(or 4 digit) category. If one product is mapped to multiple HS 6-digit (or 4-digit) categories, we 
sum up trade values of the mapped HS categories. 
We use the Codex MRL standards as the non-protectionism science-based reference 
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levels. The WTO explicitly refers to Codex MRLs as the international SPS standards of choice. 
Codex standards are established using scientific expert advice and established science, and aims 
to protect consumer health and the environment. Codex MRL standards are set by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC), which is a joint Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and World Health Organization (WHO) commission. Some Codex standard may not be 
established, and the reasons for that may be hard to determine. CAC may decide not to establish 
the MRL, or decide the chemical should not be allowed, or that the chemicals are not harmful, or 
it might be that the standard setting process is still undergoing. Codex MRLs are established 
through a multi-year process by the Codex Commission on Pesticide Residue (CCPR). Member 
countries nominate MRLs they wish to establish. It takes an average of two to four years for 
Codex to complete a standard (Roberts and Josling (2010)). However, Codex maintains a rather 
extensive list of chemical MRLs, and more than half of the countries in our dataset completely or 
partially defer to Codex standards as recommended by the SPS Agreement of the WTO.  
Therefore, to avoid ambiguity in our investigation, we focus on the subset of products 
and chemicals for which Codex MRLs are established. For countries that have non-established 
standards for certain chemicals, we substitute their default values based on that individual 
country’s default MRLs (see Table 2 and Table 3). In addition, since the GCC standards are not 
available in the database, we remove the 5 GCC countries from our sample.  
The final combined MRL dataset for calculation in this paper consists of 273 products, 77 
countries, and includes 411,304 records. The products represent about 62% of agricultural 
imports by these countries under HS 02, 04, 06-10, 12, and 15. Note that the chemicals applied to 
each product may differ, and the set (product x chemicals) associated with different countries 
may vary due to the unbalanced veterinary drug data we mentioned above. In addition, we added 
EU-27 as a group, in addition to the individual EU countries. So, in total we have 77 countries 
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(83 countries (all countries in the original MRL database), minus 5 excluded GCC countries, 
minus 2 data unavailable countries (Switzerland and Norway), plus one aggregate EU-27). 
Our MRL application is relevant in the realm of NTMs. Comprehensive data on the 
precise composition and prevalence of NTMs do not exist. However, some order of magnitude is 
available. Based on survey data of the International Trade Center, the WTO estimates that 
TBT/SPS measures represent 59 percent of NTMs affecting agriculture (WTO 2012 pp 8). 
Within these measures the same WTO source states that SPS are the 1st and 4th most prominent 
NTMs faced by EU and US exporters based on 2009 data (WTO 2012, pp 114, and Martinez, 
Mora, and Signoret, 2009). A breakdown of SPS measures is not available, but quality standards 
and limits on residues and harmful substances are important and systematically identified as one 
of the major source of burdensome SPS measures (WTO 2012, pp 111-113). In our dataset, the 
share of Codex MRLs in the total number of MRLs is 27%. Finally we note that other 
applications are possible for other SPS regulations like aflatoxin residues, and TBT standards 
such as heavy metal residues in toys. 
 
Results  
We calculated 21,021 country-by-product level protectionism scores6 with non-established 
MRLs substituted with default levels (method 1) and 18,758 country-by-product level 
protectionism scores with non-established MRLs deleted (method 2). For each method, we then 
aggregated country-by-product scores to country level and product level with 2 sets of trade 
weights, and then equal weights. 
Country level results 
We have 50 trade-weighted country level indices and 77 equally-weighted country level indices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Detailed results are available upon request.	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(available upon request). Note that the difference in number of countries is due to the availability 
of COMTRADE trade data. In addition, EU countries have the same EU standards and similar 
trade structures, so, instead of individual EU countries, we report for the aggregate EU-27. 
Mexico complies with U.S. standard, yet it has a slightly different protectionism score, which is 
caused by its own import structure leading to different weights in the indices’ aggregation. We 
also report Taiwan’s unweighted and neighbors’ trade weighted score. We could not find 
detailed agricultural trade data for Taiwan (not reported in COMTRADE). 
Table 4 presents the protectionism scores by country. The first two columns are un-
weighted scores with method 1 and method 2 respectively, the next two columns are the trade-
weighted protectionism scores, the third set are the same scores but for 2008-11 average trade 
weights, and the fourth set of two columns shows the neighbors’ trade weighted scores, which 
are trade-weighted scores but using neighbors’ trade weight to avoid downward bias in 
protectionism scores if stringency reduces trade.  For simplicity of discussion, we refer the 
(un)weighted protectionism scores calculated with method 1 and method 2 as (un)weighted score 
1 and (un)weighted score 2. The last column in the table shows the sum of non-established 
MRLs count by country. 12 countries have non-zero count of non-established MRLs. The 
number of non-established MRLs ranges from 4883 (China) to 856 (EU).  
The indices, by design, put heavier weights on the products with higher imports, which indicate 
the importance of the related products. Whether protectionism scores for large importers should 
be adjusted downwards is an open question. The MRLs could also be endogenous and may have 
appeared after an import surge (Trefler (1993)). We believe that different measures presented in 
table 4 offer complementary insights into the protectionist question. On the one hand, one could 
argue these large importers are not protecting their domestic industries –trade is sizeable-- even 
though their standards exceed international norms. Instead, the stringency could be intended to 
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protect their consumers with higher health standards and actually increase import demand. The 
political analysis of Kono (2006) states that politician in more democratic societies tend to be 
more sensitive to public safety, health and environment. Producers and consumers may demand 
higher standards.   
On the other hand, higher imports may indicate higher demand, but strict MRLs pose a hurdle for 
other countries with laxer MRL standards. Therefore, their imports come from both countries 
with equal or stricter MRLs or other non-protectionist countries that incurred extra cost to meet 
stricter standards. For those lower-standard countries, where MRLs are based on internationally 
accepted standards or even lower, the strict MRLs of large importers could represent 
protectionism. 
Table 4: Country-level Protectionism Scores7 
Country 
Unweighted 
Protectionism 
Scores 
2009 Trade 
weighted 
Protectionism 
Scores 
2008-2011 Avg. 
Trade Weighted 
Protectionism 
Scores 
Neighbor Trade 
weighted 
Protectionism 
Scores* 
Count 
non-
establis
hed 
MRLs Method1 Method2 Method1 Method2 Method1 Method2 Method1 Method2 
Taiwan 2.11 
(0.47) 
1.59 
(0.61) N/A** N/A N/A N/A 
1.89 
(0.04) 
1.34 
(0.05) 
2575 
Australia 1.93 
(0.57)*** 
1.19 
(0.43) 
1.66 
(0.04) 
1.20 
(0.04) 
1.67 
(0.04) 
1.20 
(0.04) 
1.73 
(0.05) 
1.20 
(0.02) 
2219 
Japan 1.68 
(0.76) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
1.48 
(0.06) 
1.08 
(0.03) 
1.48 
(0.06) 
1.07 
(0.02) 
1.16 
(0.05) 
0.99 
(0.02) 
1580 
Jamaica 1.51 
(0.57) 
1.27 
(0.38) 
1.22 
(0.03) 
1.12 
(0.02) 
1.22 
(0.03) 
1.13 
(0.02) 
1.24 
(0.03) 
1.16 
(0.02) 
856 
European 
Union 
1.51 
(0.57) 
1.27 
(0.38) 
1.22 
(0.04) 
1.10 
(0.02) 
1.22 
(0.04) 
1.11 
(0.02) 
1.32 
(0.03) 
1.22 
(0.02) 
856 
Turkey 1.48 
(0.55) 
1.23 
(0.65) 
1.21 
(0.03) 
1.50 
(0.08) 
1.24 
(0.02) 
1.43 
(0.07) 
1.22 
(0.03) 
1.39 
(0.05) 
4499 
Canada 1.45 
(0.49) 
1.20 
(0.42) 
1.29 
(0.03) 
1.09 
(0.02) 
1.28 
(0.03) 
1.08 
(0.02) 
1.27 
(0.02) 
1.10 
(0.02) 
2751 
Israel 1.06 
(0.21) 
1.06 
(0.21) 
1.07 
(0.01) 
1.07 
(0.01) 
1.06 
(0.01) 
1.06 
(0.01) 
1.07 
(0.01) 
1.07 
(0.01) 
0 
Brazil 1.04 
(0.12) 
1.33 
(0.55) 
1.11 
(0.01) 
1.26 
(0.04) 
1.11 
(0.01) 
1.25 
(0.03) 
1.08 
(0.01) 
1.20 
(0.03) 
4342 
Argentina 1.04 
(0.11) 
1.04 
(0.11) 
1.18 
(0.02) 
1.18 
(0.02) 
1.16 
(0.01) 
1.16 
(0.01) 
1.13 
(0.01) 
1.13 
(0.01) 
0 
Chile 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.00 0.96 2684 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Countries not listed have protectionism scores equal to one. All figures are rounded to the second digit after the 
decimal point. 
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(0.14) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Russian 
Federation 
1.03 
(0.10) 
1.54 
(0.74) 
1.07 
(0.01) 
1.80 
(0.10) 
1.07 
(0.01) 
1.79 
(0.10) 
1.04 
(0.01) 
1.37 
(0.07) 
4744 
Rep. of 
Korea 
1.01 
(0.15) 
0.97 
(0.45) 
0.99 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
0.92 
(0.02) 
3867 
China 1.01 
(0.05) 
1.04 
(0.38) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.03) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.03) 
1.01 
(0.00) 
1.05 
(0.03) 
4883 
Malaysia 0.99 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0 
Unit. Arab 
Emirates 
0.99 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
0 
Mexico 0.99 
(0.36) 
0.99 
(0.36) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.92 
(0.02) 
0.92 
(0.02) 
0 
United 
States 
0.98 
(0.36) 
0.98 
(0.36) 
0.89 
(0.02) 
0.89 
(0.02) 
0.90 
(0.02) 
0.90 
(0.02) 
0.93 
(0.01) 
0.93 
(0.01) 
0 
India 0.98 
(0.13) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
1.03 
(0.01) 
1.04 
(0.01) 
1.03 
(0.01) 
1.05 
(0.01) 
1.03 
(0.01) 
1.06 
(0.01) 
1859 
New 
Zealand 
0.97 
(0.06) 
0.97 
(0.06) 
0.97 
(0.00) 
0.97 
(0.00) 
0.97 
(0.00) 
0.97 
(0.00) 
0.98 
(0.00) 
0.98 
(0.00) 
0 
Singapore 0.96 
(0.13) 
0.96 
(0.13) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.00) 
0.98 
(0.00) 
0 
South 
Africa 
0.87 
(0.14) 
0.87 
(0.14) 
0.82 
(0.01) 
0.82 
(0.01) 
0.81 
(0.01) 
0.81 
(0.01) 
0.84 
(0.00) 
0.84 
(0.00) 
0 
Sri Lanka 0.52 
(0.20) 
0.54 
(0.19) 
0.43 
(0.01) 
0.47 
(0.01) 
0.42 
(0.01) 
0.47 
(0.01) 
0.45 
(0.01) 
0.48 
(0.01) 
0 
Albania 0.52 
(0.20) 
0.54 
(0.19) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.51 
(0.01) 
0.43 
(0.01) 
0.45 
(0.01) 
0 
Antigua 
and 
Barbuda 
0.52 
(0.20) 
0.54 
(0.19) 
0.39 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.39 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.54 
(0.01) 
0 
Cayman 
Islands 
0.52 
(0.20) 
0.54 
(0.19) N/A** N/A N/A N/A 
0.51 
(0.01) 
0.55 
(0.01) 
0 
Haiti 0.52 
(0.20) 
0.54 
(0.19) N/A** N/A N/A N/A 
0.54 
(0.01) 
0.57 
(0.01) 
0 
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 
0.52 
(0.20) 
0.54 
(0.19) 
0.39 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.39 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.55 
(0.01) 
0 
Saint Lucia 0.52 
(0.20) 
0.54 
(0.19) N/A N/A 
0.40 
(0.01) 
0.47 
(0.01) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.55 
(0.01) 
0 
*Note: Neighboring weights are import trade weights based on bordering country data from CEPII and from the 5 
closest neighboring countries for countries with no bordering states. Trade data come from COMTRADE, and these 
data are of the average of 2008-2011.**Taiwanese, Cayman Island, and Haiti detailed trade flows are not available 
in COMTRADE; Saint Lucia 2009 trade flow data are not available in COMTRADE. 
***Note: Numbers within parentheses are standard deviations of the (country×product) level protectionism scores. 
 
         The variation of scores for a given country comes from two sources: the difference between 
method 1 and method 2; and the weights and normalization method. The difference between 
scores 1 and 2 (under similar weights) depends on the number of non-established MRLs and 
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differences between the default MRL level and the other established MRLs for that country. A 
much larger score 1 than score 2 indicates a default MRL being relatively stricter than 
established MRLs and indicates that protectionism in that country is caused by a protectionist 
default rather than by a concerted effort to be stringent on a particular MRL. The data could also 
have some missing MRLs, which are confounded with non-established MRLs. We keep this 
caveat in mind when drawing implications about discrepancies between scores 1 and 2. 
 We also note some differences between trade-weighted and equally-weighted scores for a given 
country; the trade-weighted score could be higher or lower than or close to the equally-weighted 
score. Self-evidently, if a country has higher trade-weighted scores relative to equally-weighted 
scores, products with strict MRLs are heavily imported. Conversely, if a country has lower trade-
weighted scores than equally-weighted scores, products with less stringent MRLs are heavily 
imported. 
  Taiwan, Australia, Japan, the EU, Jamaica, Turkey, and Canada rank among protectionist 
MRL regimes based on score1 both weighted and unweighted (neighbor-weighted only for 
Taiwan). Taiwan, Australia, and Japan have substantial difference between score 1 and score 2, 
because of their large number of non-established MRLs and their tight default levels leading to 
their score 1 being larger than their score 2. Much of the protectionism in MRLs in these three 
countries arises from the tight default. Australia, Taiwan, the EU, and Canada also exhibit some 
protection in established MRLs. Again here the caveat applies on potentially missing data and 
the potential upward bias in score 1. The EU, Canada, and Jamaica have similar but more 
moderate patterns because of their smaller number of non-established MRLs which limits the 
magnitude of the difference between scores 1 and 2.  
 Chile, Korea, and India, despite their large number of non-established MRLs, have close score 1 
and score 2. The default MRL level of these countries (Codex) is similar to their established 
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MRLs. Since score 1 and score 2 are close, we feel confident to conclude that these countries do 
not exhibit MRL protectionism. The United States is not protectionist based on any of the 
unweighted/weighted scores 1 and scores 2, and even shows evidence of slight “anti-
protectionism” (below Codex) based on trade-weighted scores. South Africa, Albania, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Sri Lanka have score 1 and score 
2 well below one, indicating they might be under protecting their consumers. Sri Lanka’s weak 
regulatory environment for pesticides and its consequences for public health have been noted in 
the literature (Roberts et al., 2003, and Karalliedde et al., 2001). Singapore and New Zealand show 
scores very close to but slightly under 1. All other countries follow Codex and have indices equal 
to 1. 
 Also notable, the Russian Federation and Brazil have higher protectionist scores 2 than 
scores 1, suggesting that their established MRLs is chiefly responsible for their MRL 
protectionism. Their low default and large number of non-established MRLs make them appear 
moderately protectionist and mitigates the protectionism of establish MRLs. Turkey illustrates 
the importance of weights. With trade weights, it appears that protectionism arises more from 
established MRLs, whereas with unweighted scores, Turkey’s protectionism seems to come from 
both established and default MRLs. For the EU and the US, trade-weighted scores are lower than 
equally-weighted scores, indicating that some heavily imported products face less stringent 
standards. For some other countries, we observe trade-weighted scores higher than unweighted 
scores for one of or both score 1 and score 2. Stringent MRLs exceeding international norms 
affect heavily traded products, possibly as a reaction to import surges.  
 Finally, NAFTA integration on residue standards has been much deeper between Mexico 
and the United States, relative to what Canada has done with its own standards, a surprising 
finding. Unlike for tariffs, MRL regulations have not been harmonized across the three NAFTA 
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members. Each score comes with an estimated standard deviation, reflecting the variation of 
product scores for each country. For trade-weighted scores’ standard deviations, products with 
smaller import shares count for less and vise-versa. Generally, notable differences between 
scores 1 and 2 for any country, extend to their standard deviations. A significantly higher score 
(either 1 or 2) for a country tends to show higher standard deviation for the corresponding score. 
Hence, we do not see evidence of countries being non-protectionist “on average” by offsetting 
protectionist MRLs with anti-protectionist ones. In most cases, standard deviations are small 
relative to scores suggesting the scores and indices are informative.  
 Country scores based on neighboring-country trade weights provide similar qualitative 
patterns as the own-country trade weighted scores. We use the CEPII distance database to 
determine bordering countries and use the 5 shortest-distance countries for countries without 
bordering neighbors. (Details are available from the authors). The objective is detect biases if 
trade impediments result from stringent MRLs and lead to underreporting the trade impeding 
effect of MRL regulation in the country of interest. These score are shown in the last 2 columns 
of table 4. The patterns with neighbors’ weight look qualitatively similar to those obtained with 
own country trade weights. The only notable difference is for Japan for which the own trade 
weight score 1 is 1.48 whereas it falls to 1.18 using neighbors’ trade weights. For other countries 
the differences are small in absolute value. 
Product level results 
We turn to product scores next. We average them over all countries and regulated substances by 
product. Detailed scores are available upon request. The averaging over all countries leads to 
smaller variations. The maximum of equally-weighted scores 1 is 1.28 (Green onion) and 
minimum is 0.75 (Guava). The maximum of equally-weighted score 2 is 1.21 (Belgian endive) 
and minimum is 0.74 (Guava). Adding trade weights expands the variation of the scores. The 
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maximum of trade-weighted score 1 is 2.47 (Belgian endive) and minimum is 0.42 (Guava); the 
maximum of trade-weighted scores 2 is 2.10 (Belgian endive) and minimum is 0.19 (Plantain). 
Lower scores for tropical products is a recurrent theme in product scores. 
 We further computed product scores for high-income and low-income countries 
groupings. We use the WDI classification to pigeon-hole countries into the two groups. We see 
that on average high-income countries have higher product scores than low-income countries do. 
For example, unweighted scores 1, on average are almost 13% larger for high-income countries 
than they are for low-income countries. This occurs with some geographic variation. For tropical 
fruits (passion fruit, mango, guava, etc), low-income countries tend actually to have higher 
product scores than high-income countries do, which is consistent with either export quality 
objectives by these low-income countries or protection of local markets and consumers. In 
contrast for temperate products like turnips, high-income countries tend to have much higher 
product scores potentially for similar reasons. In addition, scores 1 on average, show larger 
differences (in percent deviation) between high and low income scores, than scores 2 do. So it 
appears that non-established MRLs tend o exacerbate the “high-low income “difference” on 
product scores. Trade weights also exacerbate the higher scores in high income countries relative 
to low income countries.   
 To better elucidate the product-level protectionism, we look at score distribution plots by 
grouping products by HS2 digit sectors, and then select a few commonly-discussed products to 
investigate their MRL protectionism. Table 5 shows HS2 digit sectors, associated products that 
fall into each sector, the number of products in each sector, and the number of non-established 
MRLs for the product. The boxplots of weighted protectionism scores and unweighted scores for 
each sector are presented in figures 1 and 2. The Score1 plot shows a wider dispersion and higher 
mean than score 2 for fruit and vegetables. This observation shows that substituting non-
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established MRLs with default levels risks inflating these products’ protectionism scores. Animal 
products (HS02 and HS15) seem to have little discrepancy between score 1 and score 2.  
Table 5: Products categorized in HS 2-digit sectors 
HS 2-digit sector descriptions Number 
of 
products  
Count of non-
established 
MRLs 
Details of products  
02: MEAT & EDIBLE MEAT 
OFFAL 
18 
11,505 
cattle by-products, cattle meat, cattle 
liver, etc. 
04: DAIRY, EGGS, HONEY, & 
ED. PRODUCTS 
3 
1,879 
egg, milk, milk fat 
06: LIVE TREES  
& OTHER PLANTS 
4 
355 
chicory roots, chufa, dasheen corm, 
canna edible 
07: EDIBLE VEGETABLES 131 
20,229 
bean, cabbage, pea, spinach, turnip, 
tomato, etc. 
08: ED. FRUITS & NUTS, PEEL 
OF CITRUS/MELONS 
73 
17,899 
apple, almond, banana, cherry, lemon, 
strawberry, etc 
09: COFFEE, TEA, MATE  
& SPICES 
3 
290 
ginger, pepper, savory summer 
10: CEREALS 10 
1,450 
barley grain, corn grain, rice grain, etc. 
12: OIL SEEDS/MISC. 
GRAINS/MED.PLANTS/STRAW 
8 
1,575 
cotton seed, hop dried cones, mustard 
seed, peanut, sesame seed, sugar beet  
15: ANIMAL OR VEGET. FATS, 
OILS & WAXES 
48 
192 
cattle fat, hog fat, poultry fat, sheep fat 
 
Figure1: Boxplot of Weighted Protectionsim Scores by HS 2-digit Sectors  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Cattle fat and hog fat fall into both HS15 and HS02. We have 254 distinct goods or 277 with redundant products. 
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Meat, diary, and egg products have the lowest average, and mostly span in the lower 
protectionism region. This could be due to their relatively high traditional protection via tariffs, 
tariff rate quotas and farm subsidies in OECD countries. MRL protection may not be necessary. 
Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) clustered products based on three criteria: the number of 
notified NTMs, the number of SPS trade concerns officially communicated to the WTO, and the 
share of imports affected by notified NTMs. They show that meat products and many dairy 
products fall in the clusters with high NTM trade coverage, high number of notifications, and 
high/very high number of concerns. However, they did not explicitly measure the strictness of 
individual policies. Their stylized facts together with our results on product-level protectionism 
suggest that meat and dairy products are subjected to a high number of NTM notifications but 
which are relatively less stringent.  
Figure2: Boxplot of Unweighted Protectionsim Scores by HS 2-digit Sectors 
 
These heavily regulated sectors may not be heavily protected, but rather may involve more 
health and food safety concerns. Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) also found that vegetable 
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products are spread over several clusters with high or low number of notifications. We observe a 
similar variation in protectionism scores for vegetable products; their protectionism scores have 
the widest span. The protectionism span is related to the large number of the products in this 
sector. Fruit product protectionism scores are also found to exhibit large variations. Disdier and 
van Tongeren (2010) suggest fruit products overall have a high number of notifications and high 
number of concerns. This again indicates the complexity of gauging protectionism. Frequency of 
notifications and concerns are not sufficient to establish protectionism; the actual stringency of 
the standards should also be taken into consideration.  
The differences between trade-weighted and equally-weighted scores are quite obvious 
for product-level scores. Most of the large trade-weighted scores are higher than their equally-
weighted scores counterparts, and conversely for low-level scores. A trade-weighted score being 
higher than its unweighted counterpart means that larger importers tend to have stricter MRLs 
for that product; and vise versa. More details are available in appendix table 1. This point is 
important because it shows that regulatory stringency, even beyond Codex, may actually be 
associated with large trade flows. Trade may have been facilitated by stringent food regulation. 
The conventional view of a stringent trade-impeding NTM with a positive ad valorem tariff 
equivalent is challenged by these occurrences.  
The top contributors to unweighted scores are countries that have the tightest MRLs for 
the corresponding product. Trade weights temper or exacerbate these with import shares. 
Countries, that contribute large percentage to weighted scores, have large import share and/or 
large unweighted scores contribution. A weighted commodity score is larger than its unweighted 
counterpart when countries with stricter MRLs are large or dominant importers (for example, 
sheep meat, hog meat, grapefruit). The latter is consistent with food safety concerns associated to 
popular imports. A weighted score is close to or smaller than its unweighted counterpart, when 
	  
	  
27	  
there are no dominant importers or when countries with less stringent MRLs are large importers 
(i.e., banana, poultry meat, wheat, etc.).  
A look at the top contributors in scores is interesting (see appendix table 1). For example, 
the dominant top contributor to weighted score 1 for sheep meat is the EU (43%), and the EU 
sheep meat MRLs are among the tightest (one of the top contributors to unweighted scores). 
Therefore, we see a big increase form unweighted scores to weighted scores. Australia, on the 
other hand, does not import much sheep meat while keeping tight MRLs. Australia is a large 
exporter, so it set its MRLs to meet high EU standards where it export lamb product and/or 
equally to protect its own sheep and lamb markets. The economic and rent-seeking determinants 
of protectionism scores will be investigated in a subsequent investigation.   
Robustness check 
 We evaluate the robustness of our scores with a focus on the weights used in the scores 
(between trade weighted scores and unweighted scores), and also on data limitations and their 
potential impact on the stability of the protectionism scores. Since we have several products with 
small substance counts, we find it imperative to check the robustness of the product-level 
protectionism scores as well as country-level protectionism scores relative to the variation in 
substance count per product score.  
In the dataset, the number of substances for each product ranges from 1 to 98, and we 
conjecture that this number is likely to be positively related with the “true” number of substances 
regulated for this product. One of the possible explanations for the variations could be that some 
products may raise more health concerns than others. The other potential reason, mentioned 
before, is that the list is determined by the U.S. list of substances. We have 13% of the products 
(34 out of 254) with less or equal to 5 substances (data available upon request). The 
protectionism scores for products with fewer substances may still be valid, but we certainly have 
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more confidence in the scores calculated with more substances. In order to systematically check 
the robustness, bias, variance as well as identify outliers in the product protectionism scores, we 
look at box plots of scores grouped by substance count, Quantile-Quantile plots (QQ-plots) with 
small counts against the rest, and compute some statistical tests, when applicable. 
Figure 3 shows the histograms of combinations of weighted and unweighted score 1 and 
score 2. The variation shows the patterns for weighted-unweighted, and score 1- score 2. Trade 
weight creates more dispersion and higher scores. Figures 4 and 5 show the boxplots of weighted 
and unweighted protectionism scores grouped by the number of substances. For both weighted 
and unweighted, products with fewer substances (say substance count <20) tend to have higher 
score 1 and a wider dispersion than products with more substances (say substance count >20). 
But no obvious difference is found for products with different substance counts for scores 2, both 
weighted and unweighted.  
QQ plots of product scores (available upon request) are sorted out using cut off numbers 
of substances. The difference between weighted and unweighted scores is not obvious, but we 
observe systematic difference between score 1 and score 2. Score 1 of products with smaller 
substance count show more variation (fatter left tail) in the lower side and similar variation but 
higher scores on the upper side, comparing to the same score 1 of products with larger substance 
count. Scores 2 for products with smaller substance count show more variation (fatter tails) in 
both lower and upper tails than products with larger substance count. This is consistent with the 
box plots. Scores with substance count of less or equal to 4 do not line up close to the 45-degree 
line but show a much steeper pattern.  
In addition to the plots, we conduct non-parametric Cochran tests for the variability and 
differences among product scores groups. We group products by substance count, i.e., substance 
count equals 1-4, 5-9, 9-10, etc., and try to make each group of similar size of about 30 products.  
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Figure 3: Histograms of Protectionism Scores 
 
Figure 4: Boxplots of Weighted Scores by Groups of Substance Count 
 
 
The test suggests that the product group with less or equal to 4 substances have “outlying 
variance” for all combinations of weighted/unweighted/score1/score 2, which means that the 
scores of products with no more than 4 substances exhibit more variability than the rest. 
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However, there is a caveat to the test, which is that it maintains normality, which is rejected for 
unweighted scores and for some groups of weighted scores. 
Figure 5: Boxplots of Unweighted Scores by Groups of Substance Count 
 
We also check the robustness of country-level scores. We compare the country 
protectionism scores by gradually deleting products with up to 5 substances, and recalculate 
them. We see only negligible variations in the scores and country ranking, which strongly 
suggests that country level scores are robust to the presence of products scores established based 
on fewer substances (results are available upon request). Finally we check if the incomplete 
coverage of veterinary drugs affects our country scores. We re-compute the country score by 
dropping the veterinary drug MRLs. Results are almost unchanged. The average change in a 
country score is less than 1%. Four countries have a score difference larger than 3 % but smaller 
than 8% in absolute value. The ranking of countries is unaffected by abstracting from MRLs on 
veterinary drugs. So we conclude that this incomplete coverage of veterinary drugs is not an 
issue. (Results are available from the authors) 
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Conclusion 
We proposed well-designed aggregation indices of NTMs to quantify the protectionism of 
Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) regulations at various level using a science-based criteria 
embodied in international standards such as Codex Alimentarius. The proposed indices aggregate 
a similar type of policies and do not suffer from the usual issue of aggregating heterogeneous 
policy tools into a single index. The latter is difficult to interpret when it is found to affect trade 
flows. We applied the aggregators to a large international dataset on pesticide and veterinary 
drug MRLs and associated CODEX MRL standards. We calculated both trade-weighted and 
equally-weighted scores, since they offer complementary information. Looking at country 
scores, trade weights do not appear to be pivotal and the bias introduced by trade weights is 
occasional and small. However, we found trade weights induce more dispersion of product 
scores. Considering or not non-established MRLs is quite important in establishing a country’s 
MRL protectionism. The latter can arise from strict established MRLs or from strict default 
MRLs, or both. 
Country-level results show that Australia and Taiwan rank the most protectionist from all 
indices: trade weighted when available, neighbors’ trade weighted and equally weighted, using 
score 1 because of their tight default value. The Russian Federation ranks the most protectionist 
from scores based on established MRLs (no default). Other countries ranked differently to 
various extents based on the different weights used. However, the set of most protectionist 
countries is remarkably stable over the change of weights in indices. We also found that NAFTA 
integration on residue standards has been much deeper between Mexico and the United States, 
than with Canada which as set sits MRLs way above Codex and its NAFTA trade partners. 
Product level protectionism scores are useful for econometric investigation of 
disaggregated trade flows and allow to characterize the MRL regulatory regimes for these 
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products. Meat and dairy products (HS02, HS04, HS15) have lower protectionism scores in 
general than other goods. Fruit and vegetable products (HS07, HS08) exhibit the most within-
sector variation in protectionism with tropical fruits exhibiting the lowest scores. Breaking down 
scores by top contributors, we found that products like beans, apple, cattle meat, etc. are 
controlled by a few dominant importers who set stricter MRLs than other small importers. We 
checked the robustness of scores to address concerns for products with fewer substances used in 
their scores. Products with fewer substances seemed consistently biased upward (higher 
protectionism scores). Some evidence suggests that products scores based on no more than 3 
substances have higher variance or noise. As a positive note, country level scores are robust to 
the deletion of products with fewer substances and provide solid policy implications. 
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Appendix Table 1: Top Contributors of Protectionism Scores for Selected Products 
Product Score type and level9 Top 5 contributing countries 
Total 
contributi
on 
Subs. 
Count 
Non-
established 
MRLs count 
Apple 
weighted 
score 1 1.11 EU (32%), Russia (20%), Canada (5%), Mexico (5%), US (5%) 
67% 
64 580 
weighted score 
2 1.17 
EU (30%), Russia (26%), Mexico (5%), 
US (5%), Canada (4%) 
70% 
unweighted 
score 1 1.02 
Australia (3%), Turkey (3%), Argentina 
(3%), Brazil (3%), Israel (3%)  
15% 
unweighted 
score 2 1.03 Turkey (4%), Russia (3%), Brazil (3%), Argentina (3%), Israel (3%) 
16% 
Banana 
weighted score 
1 0.88 
EU (46%), US (19%), Japan (10%), 
Russia (8%), Canada (6%) 
89% 
21 121 
weighted score 
2 0.85 EU (48%), US (20%), Japan (11%), 
Canada (6%), Russia (4%) 
89% 
unweighted 
score 1 0.96 
Canada (3%), Israel (3%), Brazil (3%), 
Singapore (2%), Argentina (2%) 
13% 
Unweighted 
score 2 0.95 Canada (3%), Brazil (3%), Israel (3%), Singapore (3%), Argentina (3%) 
15% 
Cattle, meat 
weighted score 
1 1.17 
US (17%), Japan (15%), Russia (14%), 
EU (14%), Mexico (7%) 
67% 
90 1152 
weighted score 
2 1.38 
Russia (27%), US (14%), Japan (13%), 
EU (11%), Mexico (6%) 
71% 
unweighted 
score 1 1.05 
Australia (3%), Jamaica (3%), EU (3%), 
Mexico (3%), Japan (3%) 
15% 
Unweighted 
score 2 1.08 
Russia (5%), Jamaica (3%), EU (3%), 
Mexico (3%), Australia (3%) 
17% 
Corn, grain 
weighted score 
1 0.98 
EU (21%), Malaysia (19%), US (18%), 
Canada (7%), Russia (5%) 
70% 
42 243 
weighted score 
2 0.97 
Malaysia (20%), EU (20%), US (18%), 
Canada (7%), Russia (5%)  
70% 
unweighted 
score 1 1 
Australia (3%), Israel (2%), China (2%), 
India (2%), Turkey (2%) 
11% 
Unweighted 
score 2 1 
China (3%), Turkey (3%), Indonesia 
(2%), Israel (2%), India (2%) 
12% 
Hog, meat 
weighted score 
1 1.24 
Japan (43%), Russia (16%), Mexico (8%), 
US (8%), Korea (5%) 
80% 62 403 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  We	  only	  present	  own-­‐trade	  weighted	  scores	  here.	  Neighbors’	  trade	  weighted	  scores	  are	  available	  upon	  request.	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weighted score 
2 1.47 
Japan (35%), Russia (30%), Mexico (7%), 
US (6%), Korea (4%) 
82% 
unweighted 
score1 1.07 
Jamaica (3%), EU (3%), Mexico (3%), 
Australia (3%), Japan (3%)  
15% 
Unweighted 
score 2 1.09 
Russia (6%), Jamaica (4%), Mexico (4%), 
EU (4%), Canada (3%) 
21% 
Grapefruit 
weighted score 
1 1.27 
EU (63%), Japan (19%), Russia (9%), 
Canada (6%), Hong Kong (1%) 
98% 
43 241 
weighted score 
2 1.32 
EU (60%), Japan (16%), Russia (16%), 
Canada (4%), Hong Kong (1%) 
97% 
unweighted 
score 1 1.06 
Australia (4%), Turkey (4%), EU (4%), 
Canada (4%), Argentina (3%) 
19% 
Unweighted 
score 2 1.08 
Russia (6%), Turkey (5%), EU (4%), 
Brazil (3%), Argentina (3%) 
21% 
Poultry, 
meat 
weighted score 
1 0.98 
Hong Kong (17%), Russia (16%), China 
(13%), Japan (13%), Mexico (9%) 
68% 
45 281 
weighted score 
2 1.04 
Russia (21%), Hong Kong (16%), China 
(12%), Japan (12%), Mexico (8%) 
69% 
unweighted 
score 1 0.97 
Russia (2%), Japan (2%), EU (2%), Chile 
(2%), Singapore (2%) 
10% 
Unweighted 
score 2 0.98 
Russia (3%), Japan (2%), Chile (2%), 
Singapore (2%), Thailand (2%) 
11% 
Sheep, 
meat 
weighted score 
1 1.33 
EU (53%), US (17%), United Arab 
Emirates (6%), Japan (4%), Canada (4%) 
84% 
66 487 
weighted score 
2 1.34 
EU (50%), US (17%), United Arab 
Emirates (6%), Canada (5%), China (5%)  
83% 
unweighted 
score 1 1.06 
Jamaica (3%), Australia (3%), EU (3%), 
Japan (3%), Mexico (3%) 
15% 
Unweighted 
score 2 1.1 
Russia (6%), Canada (4%), Jamaica (3%), 
Australia (3%), EU (3%) 
19% 
Wheat, 
grain 
weighted score 
1 1.05 
EU (10%), Algeria (9%), Egypt (8%), 
Japan (7%), Indonesia (7%) 
41% 
38 200 
weighted score 
2 1.1 
Turkey (9%), EU (9%), Algeria (9%), 
Egypt (7%), Indonesia (7%) 
41% 
unweighted 
score1 1.05 
Australia (3%), Canada (3%), Turkey 
(3%), India (3%), China (3%)  
15% 
Unweighted 
score2 1.07 
Turkey (5%), China (3%), Australia (3%), 
India (3%), Russia (3%) 
17% 
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  Appendix Table 2. (NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION)  Pesticides, Veterinary drugs, 
Plants Product Commodities, Animal Product Commodities and Country coverage of the 
MRL Date Base 
Pesticides 
1,3-Dichloropropene 
1-Naphthaleneacetamide 
1-Naphthaleneacetic acid 
2, 6-Diisopropylnaphthalene (2, 
6-DIPN) 
2,4-D 
2,4-DB 
Abamectin 
Acephate 
Acequinocyl 
Acetamiprid 
Acetochlor 
Acibenzolar-S-methyl 
Acifluorfen 
Alachlor 
Aldicarb 
Alpha-Cypermethrin 
Ametoctradin 
Ametryn 
Amicarbazone 
Aminopyralid 
Amitraz 
Asulam 
Atrazine 
Aviglycine 
Azinphos-methyl 
Azoxystrobin 
Benfluralin 
Benoxacor 
Bensulfuron-methyl 
Bensulide 
Bentazon 
Beta-cyfluthrin 
Bifenazate 
Bifenthrin 
Bispyribac-sodium 
Boscalid 
Bromacil 
Bromoxynil 
Buprofezin 
Butafenacil 
Captan 
Carbaryl 
Carbon disulfide 
Carboxin 
Carfentrazone-ethyl 
Chlorantraniliprole 
Chlorethoxyphos 
Chlorfenapyr 
Chlorimuron-ethyl 
Chlorothalonil 
Chlorpropham 
Chlorpyrifos 
Chlorpyrifos-methyl 
Chlorsulfuron 
Clethodim 
Clodinafop-propargyl 
Clofentezine 
Clomazone 
Clopyralid 
Cloquintocet-mexyl 
Cloransulam-methyl 
Clothianidin 
Coumaphos 
Cryolite 
Cyazofamid 
Cyclanilide 
Cycloate 
Cyflufenamid 
Cyfluthrin 
Cyhalofop-butyl 
Cymoxanil 
Cypermethrin 
Cyproconazole 
Cyprodinil 
Cyprosulfamide 
Cyromazine 
d-Phenothrin 
DCPA 
Deltamethrin 
Desmedipham 
Diazinon 
Dicamba 
Dichlobenil 
Dichlormid 
Dichlorvos 
Diclofop-Methyl 
Dicloran 
Diclosulam 
Dicofol 
Dicrotophos 
Difenoconazole 
Diflubenzuron 
Diflufenzopyr 
Dimethenamid 
Dimethenamid-P 
Dimethoate 
Dimethomorph 
Dinotefuran 
Diphenylamine 
Diquat dibromide 
Disulfoton 
Diuron 
Dodine 
Emamectin 
Endosulfan 
Endothall 
EPTC 
Esfenvalerate 
Ethalfluralin 
Ethametsulfuron-methyl 
Ethephon 
Ethofumesate 
Ethoprop 
Ethoxyquin 
Ethylene chlorohydrin 
Ethylene oxide 
Etofenprox 
Etoxazole 
Etridiazole 
Famoxadone 
Fenamidone 
Fenarimol 
Fenbuconazole 
Fenbutatin-oxide 
Fenhexamid 
Fenoxaprop-Ethyl 
Fenpropathrin 
Fenpyrazamine 
Fenpyroximate 
Fentin hydroxide 
Ferbam 
Fipronil 
Flazasulfuron 
Flonicamid 
Florasulam 
Fluazifop-P-butyl 
Fluazinam 
Flubendiamide 
Flucarbazone-sodium 
Fludioxonil 
Flufenacet 
Flufenoxuron 
Flufenpyr-ethyl 
Flumetsulam 
Flumiclorac-pentyl 
Flumioxazin 
Fluometuron 
Fluopicolide 
Fluopyram 
Fluoride 
Fluoxastrobin 
Fluridone 
Fluroxypyr 
Fluthiacet-methyl 
Flutolanil 
Flutriafol 
Fluxapyroxad 
Folpet 
Fomesafen 
Forchlorfenuron 
Formetanate hydrochloride 
Fosetyl-Al 
Fosthiazate 
Furilazole 
Gamma Cyhalothrin 
Glufosinate-ammonium 
Glyphosate 
Halosulfuron-methyl 
Hexazinone 
1 
	  
Hexythiazox 
Hydramethylnon 
Hydrogen Cyanide 
Hydroprene 
Imazalil 
Imazamethabenz 
Imazapic-ammonium 
Imazapyr 
Imazaquin 
Imazethapyr 
Imazosulfuron 
Imidacloprid 
Indaziflam 
Indoxacarb 
Inorganic bromide resulting 
from fumigation with methyl 
bromide 
Iodosulfuron-methyl 
Ipconazole 
Iprodione 
Isoxaben 
Isoxadifen-ethyl 
Isoxaflutole 
Kasugamycin 
Kresoxim-methyl 
Lactofen 
Lambda Cyhalothrin 
Linuron 
Malathion 
Maleic hydrazide 
Mancozeb 
Mandipropamid 
MCPA 
MCPB 
Mefenpyr-diethyl 
Mepiquat chloride 
Meptyldinocap 
Mesosulfuron-methyl 
Mesotrione 
Metaflumizone 
Metalaxyl 
Metalaxyl-M (Mefenoxam) 
Metaldehyde 
Metconazole 
Methamidophos 
Methanearsonic acid 
Methidathion 
Methomyl 
Methoxyfenozide 
Methyl Parathion 
Metiram 
Metolachlor 
Metrafenone 
Metribuzin 
Metsulfuron-methyl 
MGK 264 (n-octyl 
bicycloheptene dicarboximid) 
Myclobutanil 
Naled 
Napropamide 
Naptalam 
Nicosulfuron 
Nitrapyrin 
Norflurazon 
Novaluron 
O-phenylphenol 
Orthosulfamuron 
Oryzalin 
Oxamyl 
Oxydemeton-methyl 
Oxyfluorfen 
Oxytetracycline 
Paraquat dichloride 
Pendimethalin 
Penflufen 
Penoxsulam 
Pentachloronitrobenzene 
Penthiopyrad 
Permethrin 
Phenmedipham 
Phorate 
Phosmet 
Phosphine 
Picloram 
Picoxystrobin 
Pinoxaden 
Piperonyl Butoxide 
Pirimiphos-methyl 
Prallethrin 
Primisulfuron-methyl 
Procymidone 
Profenofos 
Prohexadione calcium 
Prometryn 
Propachlor 
Propamocarb hydrochloride 
Propanil 
Propargite 
Propazine 
Propetamphos 
Propiconazole 
Propoxycarbazone 
Propylene chlorohydrin 
Propylene oxide 
Propyzamide 
Prosulfuron 
Prothioconazole 
Pymetrozine 
Pyraclostrobin 
Pyraflufen-ethyl 
Pyrasulfotole 
Pyrazon 
Pyrethrins 
Pyridaben 
Pyridalyl 
Pyridate 
Pyrimethanil 
Pyriproxyfen 
Pyrithiobac sodium 
Pyroxasulfone 
Pyroxsulam 
Quinclorac 
Quinoxyfen 
Quizalofop-ethyl 
Resmethrin 
Rimsulfuron 
S-metolachlor 
Saflufenacil 
Sedaxane 
Sethoxydim 
Simazine 
Spinetoram 
Spinosad 
Spirodiclofen 
Spiromesifen 
Spirotetramat 
Spiroxamine 
Streptomycin 
Sulfentrazone 
Sulfosulfuron 
Sulfoxaflor 
Sulfur dioxide 
Sulfuryl fluoride 
TCMTB 
Tebuconazole 
Tebufenozide 
Tebuthiuron 
Tefluthrin 
Tembotrione 
Tepraloxydim 
Terbacil 
Terbufos 
Tetrachlorvinphos 
Tetraconazole 
Thiabendazole 
Thiacloprid 
Thiamethoxam 
Thiazopyr 
Thidiazuron 
Thiencarbazone-methyl 
Thifensulfuron-methyl 
Thiobencarb 
Thiodicarb 
Thiophanate-methyl 
Thiram 
Topramezone 
Tralkoxydim 
Tri-Allate 
Triadimefon 
Triadimenol 
Triasulfuron 
Tribenuron Methyl 
Tribufos 
Triclopyr 
Trifloxystrobin 
Trifloxysulfuron 
Triflumizole 
Trifluralin 
Triflusulfuron-methyl 
Trinexapac-ethyl 
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Triticonazole 
Uniconazole-P 
Zeta-Cypermethrin 
Zinc phosphide 
Ziram 
Zoxamide 
 
Veterinary drugs 
Albendazole  
Altrenogest  
Amoxicillin  
Ampicillin  
Amprolium  
Apramycin  
Arsenic  
Bacitracin  
Carbadox  
Carbomycin  
Ceftiofur  
Cephapirin  
Chlorhexidine  
Chlortetracycline  
Clopidol  
Clorsulon  
Cloxacillin  
Danofloxacin  
Decoquinate  
Dichlorvos  
Diclazuril  
Dihydrostreptomycin  
Doramectin  
Enrofloxacin  
Eprinomectin  
Erythromycin  
Estradiol  
Ethopabate  
Famphur  
Fenbendazole  
Fenprostalene  
Florfenicol  
Flunixin  
Gentamicin sulfate  
Halofuginone hydrobromide 
Haloxon  
Hygromycin B  
Ivermectin  
Laidlomycin  
Lasalocid  
Levamisole hydrochloride  
Lincomycin  
Maduramicin ammonium  
Melengestrol acetate  
Metoserpate hydrochloride 
Monensin  
Morantel tartrate  
Moxidectin  
Narasin  
Neomycin  
Nequinate  
Nicarbazin  
Novobiocin  
Nystatin  
Oleandomycin  
Ormetoprim  
Oxfendazole  
Oxytetracycline  
Penicillin  
Piperazine  
Pirlimycin 
Progesterone 
Pyrantel tartrate 
Ractopamine 
Robenidine hydrochloride 
Semduramicin 
Sodium sulfachloropyrazine 
monohydrate 
Spectinomycin 
Streptomycin 
Sulfabromomethazine sodium 
Sulfachlorpyridazine 
Sulfadimethoxine 
Sulfaethoxypyridazine 
Sulfamethazine 
Sulfaquinoxaline 
Sulfathiazole 
Sulfomyxin 
Testosterone propionate 
Tetracycline 
Thiabendazole 
Tiamulin 
Tilmicosin 
Tripelennamine 
Tulathromycin 
Tylosin 
Virginiamycin 
Zeranol 
Zilpaterol 
Zoalene 
 
Plant products and 
animal commodities 
Acerola  
Allspice  
Amaranth, leafy  
Ambarella  
Angelica, dry  
Angelica, stem and leaves  
Anise, seed  
Anise, star  
Annatto, seed  
Apple  
Apricot  
Apricot, Japanese  
Aronia berry  
Arracacha, root  
Arrowroot, tuber  
Artichoke, Chinese, tuber  
Artichoke, globe  
Artichoke, Jerusalem, tuber 
Arugula  
Asparagus  
Atemoya  
Avocado  
Azarole  
Balm, leaves  
Balm, leaves, dry  
Balsam apple  
Balsam pear  
Banana  
Barley, grain  
Basil  
Basil, dry  
Bean, broad (fava), succulent 
Bean, dry (adzuki)  
Bean, dry (field)  
Bean, dry (kidney)  
Bean, dry (lablab)  
Bean, dry (lima)  
Bean, dry (moth)  
Bean, dry (mung)  
Bean, dry (navy)  
Bean, dry (pinto)  
Bean, dry (rice)  
Bean, dry (snap)  
Bean, dry (tepary)  
Bean, dry (urd)  
Bean, dry (wax)  
Bean, dry (yardlong)  
Bean, dry, broad (fava)  
Bean, kidney, succulent  
Bean, lima, succulent  
Bean, moth, succulent  
Bean, mung, succulent  
Bean, navy, succulent  
Bean, pinto, succulent  
Bean, scarlet runner, succulent 
Bean, snap, succulent  
Bean, wax, succulent  
Bean, yardlong, succulent  
Bearberry  
Beet, garden, root 
Beet, garden, tops  
Bilberry  
Blackberry  
Blewitt, edible fungi  
Blueberry, highbush  
Blueberry, lowbush  
Borage  
Borage, dry  
Borage, seed  
Boysenberry  
Broccoli  
Broccoli raab  
Broccoli, Chinese 
Brussels sprouts  
Buckwheat, grain  
Buffaloberry  
Bunashimeji, edible fungi  
Burdock, edible, root  
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Burdock, edible, tops  
Burnet  
Burnet, dry  
Cabbage  
Cabbage, Chinese, bok choy 
Cabbage, Chinese, mustard, gai 
choy  
Cabbage, Chinese, napa  
Calamondin  
Calendula, seed  
Camomile  
Camomile, dry  
Canna, edible, tuber  
Cantaloupe  
Caper buds  
Caraway, black, seed  
Caraway, seed  
Cardamom, seed  
Cardoon  
Carrot  
Carrot, tops  
Cassava, root  
Cassava, tops  
Cassia bark  
Cassia buds  
Castor oil plant  
Catjang, dry  
Catmint (catnip)  
Catmint (catnip), dry  
Cattle, by products  
Cattle, fat  
Cattle, kidney  
Cattle, liver  
Cattle, meat  
Cauliflower  
Cavalo broccolo  
Celeriac (celery root), root  
Celeriac (celery root), tops  
Celery  
Celery seed  
Celery, leaves  
Celtuce  
Chaya, leaves  
Chayote, fruit  
Chayote, root  
Che  
Cherimoya  
Cherry, black  
Cherry, capulin  
Cherry, Nanking  
Cherry, sweet  
Cherry, tart  
Chervil  
Chervil, dry  
Chervil, turnip, root  
Chervil, turnip, tops  
Chicken, byproducts  
Chicken, fat  
Chicken, kidney  
Chicken, liver  
Chicken, meat  
Chickpea, dry  
Chicory, root  
Chicory, tops  
Chilean guava  
Chinese tallowtree, seed  
Chinquapin  
Chironja  
Chive, Chinese dried leaves 
Chive, Chinese, fresh leaves 
Chive, dried leaves  
Chive, fresh leaves  
Chokecherry  
Chrysanthemum, edible-leaved 
Chrysanthemum, garland  
Chufa, tuber  
Cinnamon, bark  
Citrus, citron  
Clary  
Clary, dry  
Cloudberry  
Clove buds  
Coconut  
Coffee bean, green  
Collards  
Coriander, leaf (cilantro)  
Coriander, leaf (cilantro), dry 
Coriander, seed  
Corn salad  
Corn, grain  
Corn, pop  
Corn, sweet  
Costmary  
Costmary, dry  
Cottonseed  
Cowpea, dry  
Cowpea, succulent  
Crabapple  
Crambe  
Cranberry  
Cranberry, highbush  
Cress, garden  
Cress, upland  
Cucumber  
Cucumber, Chinese  
Culantro, leaf, dry  
Culantro, seed  
Culantro. leaf  
Cumin, seed  
Cuphea, seed  
Currant, black  
Currant, buffalo  
Currant, red, white  
Curry, leaf  
Curry, leaf, dry  
Custard Apple  
Dandelion, leaves 
Date  
Daylily, bulb  
Dewberry  
Dill  
Dill seed 
Dill, dry  
Dock (sorrel)  
Dragon fruit  
Durian  
Echium, seed  
Eggplant  
Eggplant, African 
Eggplant, pea  
Eggplant, scarlet  
Eggs, chicken  
Eggs, turkey  
Elderberry  
Elegans hosta  
Endive (escarole)  
Endive, Belgian  
Enoki, edible fungi  
Euphorbia, seed  
European barberry  
Evening primrose, seed  
Feijoa (Pineapple Guava)  
Fennel, bulb  
Fennel, Florence, seed  
Fennel, leaves  
Fennel, leaves, dry  
Fennel, seed  
Fenugreek, seed  
Fig  
Flaxseed/Linseed  
Fritillaria, bulb  
Fritillaria, leaves  
Garden huckleberry  
Garlic, bulb  
Garlic, great headed, bulb  
Garlic, serpent, bulb  
Gherkin, West Indian  
Ginger, root  
Ginger, white, flowers  
Ginseng, root  
Goji berry  
Gold of pleasure  
Gooseberry  
Gourd, buffalo, seed  
Gourd, edible (bottle)  
Grains of paradise  
Grape, table  
Grape, wine  
Grapefruit  
Grapefruit, Japanese summer 
Groundcherry  
Guar, dry  
Guava  
Hare's ear mustard, seed  
Hime-Matsutake, edible fungi 
Hirmeola, edible fungi  
Hog, by products  
Hog, fat  
Hog, kidney  
Hog, liver  
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Hog, meat  
Honeysuckle, edible  
Hop, dried cones  
Horehound  
Horehound, dry  
Horseradish, root  
Huckleberry  
Hyssop  
Hyssop, dry  
Jaboticaba  
Jackbean, succulent  
Jackfruit  
Japanese horse-chestnut  
Jojoba, seed  
Jostaberry  
Jujube, Chinese  
Juneberry (Saskatoon berry) 
Juniper berry  
Kale  
Kapok, seed  
Kiwifruit, fuzzy  
Kiwifruit, hardy  
Kohlrabi 
Kumquat  
Kurrat  
Lady's leek  
Lavender  
Lavender, dry  
Leek  
Leek, wild  
Lemon  
Lemongrass  
Lemongrass, dry  
Lentil, dry  
Lentil, succulent  
Leren, tuber  
Lesquerella, seed  
Lettuce, head  
Lettuce, leaf  
Lily, bulb  
Lime  
Lime, Australian desert  
Lime, Australian finger  
Lime, Australian round  
Lime, Brown River finger  
Lime, Mount White  
Lime, New Guinea wild  
Lime, Russell river  
Lime, sweet  
Lime, Tahiti  
Lingonberry  
Loganberry  
Longan  
Loofah, angled  
Loofah, smooth  
Loquat  
Lovage, leaf  
Lovage, leaf, dry  
Lovage, seed  
Lunaria, seed  
Lupin (succulent)  
Lupin, dry  
Lychee (litchi)  
Mace  
Maitake, edible fungi  
Mandarin, Mediterranean  
Mango  
Mangosteen  
Marigold (calendula) flowers 
Marigold (calendula) flowers, 
dry  
Marjoram  
Marjoram, dry  
Martynia  
Mayhaw  
Maypop  
Meadowfoam, seed  
Medlar  
Melon, casaba  
Melon, citron  
Melon, crenshaw  
Melon, golden pershaw  
Melon, honey ball  
Melon, honeydew  
Melon, mango  
Melon, Persian  
Melon, pineapple  
Melon, Santa Claus  
Melon, snake  
Milk fat, cattle  
Milk, cattle  
Milkweed, seed  
Millet, pearl, grain  
Millet, proso, grain  
Mizuna  
Morel, edible fungi  
Mountain pepper berries  
Mulberry  
Muntries  
Mushroom, button  
Mushroom, Chinese  
Mushroom, oyster  
Mushroom, reishi  
Mushroom, Rodman's agaricus 
Mushroom, shiitake  
Muskmelon  
Mustard greens  
Mustard seed, black  
Mustard seed, field  
Mustard seed, Indian (brown) 
Mustard seed, white/yellow 
Mustard spinach  
Nameko, edible fungi  
Naranjilla  
Nasturtium, garden leaves  
Nasturtium, garden leaves, dry 
Native currant  
Nectarine  
Net Bearing, edible fungi  
Niger, seed  
Nut, African nut-tree  
Nut, almond  
Nut, beech  
Nut, Brazil  
Nut, Brazilian pine  
Nut, bunya  
Nut, bur oak  
Nut, butter  
Nut, cajou  
Nut, candle  
Nut, cashew  
Nut, chestnut  
Nut, coquito  
Nut, dika  
Nut, ginkgo  
Nut, Guiana chestnut  
Nut, hazelnut (filbert)  
Nut, heartnut  
Nut, hickory  
Nut, macadamia  
Nut, Mongongo  
Nut, monkey puzzle  
Nut, monkey-pot  
Nut, okari  
Nut, pachira  
Nut, peach palm  
Nut, pecan  
Nut, pequi  
Nut, pili  
Nut, pine  
Nut, pistachio  
Nut, sapucaia  
Nut, tropical almond  
Nut, walnut, black  
Nut, walnut, English (Persian) 
Nut, yellowhorn  
Nutmeg  
Oat, grain  
Oil radish, seed  
Okra  
Olive, table  
Onion, Beltsville bunching 
Onion, bulb  
Onion, Chinese, bulb  
Onion, fresh  
Onion, green  
Onion, macrostem  
Onion, pearl  
Onion, potato, bulb  
Onion, tree, tops  
Onion, Welsh, tops  
Orach  
Orange, sour  
Orange, sweet  
Orange, tachibana  
Orange, trifoliate  
Palm heart  
Palm heart, leaves  
Papaya  
Parsley, dry  
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Parsley, fresh  
Parsley, turnip-rooted  
Parsnip, root  
Parsnip, tops  
Partridgeberry 
Passion fruit 
Pawpaw 
Pea, blackeyed, succulent 
Pea, dry (blackeyed) 
Pea, dry (crowder) 
Pea, dry (dwarf) 
Pea, dry (English) 
Pea, dry (field) 
Pea, dry (garden) 
Pea, dry (green) 
Pea, dry (pigeon) 
Pea, dry (snow) 
Pea, dry (southern) 
Pea, dry (sugar snap) 
Pea, dwarf, succulent 
Pea, English, succulent 
Pea, field, succulent 
Pea, garden, succulent 
Pea, green, succulent 
Pea, pigeon, succulent 
Pea, snow, succulent 
Pea, southern, succulent 
Pea, sugar snap, succulent 
Peach 
Peanut 
Pear 
Pear, Asian 
Pennyroyal 
Pennyroyal, dry 
Pepino 
Pepper leaf 
Pepper, bell 
Pepper, black 
Pepper, non-bell 
Pepper, white 
Peppermint 
Peppermint, dry 
Peppermint, oil 
Persimmon, American 
Persimmon, Japanese 
Phalsa 
Pincherry 
Pineapple 
Plantain 
Plum, American 
Plum, beach 
Plum, Canada 
Plum, cherry 
Plum, chickasaw 
Plum, damson 
Plum, Japanese 
Plum, Klamath 
Plum, prune, dry 
Plum, prune, fresh 
Plumcot 
Pom Pom, edible fungi 
Pomegranate 
Poppy, seed 
Potato 
Prickly pear cactus, fruit 
Prickly pear cactus, pads 
Pummelo 
Pumpkin 
Purslane, garden 
Purslane, winter 
Quince 
Quince, Chinese 
Quince, Japanese 
Radicchio (red chicory) 
Radish, oriental (daikon), root 
Radish, oriental (daikon), tops 
Radish, root 
Radish, tops 
Raisin 
Rape greens 
Rape seed (canola) 
Raspberry, black/red 
Raspberry, wild 
Rhubarb 
Riberry 
Rice, grain 
Rice, wild, grain 
Rose hips 
Roselle, buds 
Rosemary 
Rosemary, dry 
Rue 
Rue, dry 
Rutabaga, root 
Rutabaga, tops 
Rye, grain 
Safflower, seed 
Saffron 
Sage 
Sage, dry 
Salal 
Salsify, black, root 
Salsify, black, tops 
Salsify, root 
Salsify, Spanish, root 
Salsify, tops 
Sapodilla 
Sapote, black 
Sapote, mammey 
Sapote, white 
Satsuma mandarin 
Savory, summer 
Savory, summer, dry 
Savory, winter 
Savory, winter, dry 
Schisandra berry 
Sea buckthorn 
Serviceberry 
Sesame, seed 
Shallot, bulb 
Shallot, fresh leaves 
Sheep, by products 
Sheep, fat 
Sheep, kidney 
Sheep, liver 
Sheep, meat 
Shimeji, edible fungi 
Skirret, root 
Sloe 
Sorghum, grain 
Soursop 
Soybean 
Soybean (immature seed) 
Spanish lime 
Spearmint 
Spearmint, dry 
Spearmint, oil 
Spinach 
Spinach, New Zealand 
Spinach, vine 
Squash, summer (crookneck) 
Squash, summer (scallop) 
Squash, summer (straightneck) 
Squash, summer (vegetable 
marrow) 
Squash, summer (zucchini) 
Squash, winter (acorn) 
Squash, winter (butternut) 
Squash, winter (calabaza) 
Squash, winter (hubbard) 
Squash, winter (spaghetti) 
Star apple 
Starfruit 
Stokes aster, seed 
Strawberry 
Stropharia, edible fungi 
Sugar apple 
Sugar cane 
Sugar, beet, roots 
Sugar, beet, tops 
Sunberry 
Sunflower, seed 
Surinam cherry 
Sweet bay 
Sweet bay, dry 
Sweet potato 
Sweet potato, tops 
Sweet rocket, seed 
Swiss chard 
Swordbean 
Tallowwood, seed 
Tamarind 
Tangelo 
Tangerine (mandarin) 
Tangor 
Tanier, corm 
Tanier, tops 
Tansy 
Tansy, dry 
Taro (dasheen), corm 
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Tarragon 
Tarragon, dry 
Tea oil plant 
Tea, leaves 
Tejocote 
Teosinte, grain 
Thyme 
Thyme, dry 
Ti, leaves 
Ti, roots 
Tomatillo 
Tomato 
Tomato, bush 
Tomato, currant 
Tomato, tree 
Triticale, grain 
Truffle, edible fungi 
Turkey, byproducts 
Turkey, fat 
Turkey, kidney 
Turkey, liver 
Turkey, meat 
Turmeric, root 
Turnip, root 
Turnip, tops 
Ugli/Uniq fruit 
Vanilla, beans 
Vernonia, seed 
Wasabi, roots 
Watercress 
Watermelon 
Wax jambu 
Waxgourd 
Wheat, grain 
White jelly fungi 
Wintergreen, leaves 
Wintergreen, leaves, dry 
Woodruff 
Woodruff, dry 
Wormwood 
Wormwood, dry 
Yam bean (jicama), root 
Yam, true, tops 
Yam, true, tuber 
Youngberry 
 
Countries 
United States  
Codex  
European Union  
Albania  
Algeria  
Angola  
Antigua and Barbuda  
Argentina  
Australia  
Bahamas  
Bahrain  
Bangladesh  
Barbados  
Belgium  
Bermuda  
Brazil  
Brunei  
Cambodia  
Canada  
Cayman Islands  
Chile  
China  
Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Cuba  
Customs Union  
Denmark  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
Egypt  
El Salvador  
Finland  
France  
French Pacific Islands  
French West Indies  
Germany  
Greece  
Guatemala  
Gulf Cooperation Council  
Haiti  
Honduras  
Hong Kong  
Iceland  
India  
Indonesia  
Ireland  
Israel  
Italy  
Jamaica  
Japan  
Jordan  
Kenya  
Korea  
Kuwait  
Lebanon  
Malaysia  
Mexico  
Morocco  
Netherlands  
Netherlands Antilles  
Nevis 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Lucia 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
 
 
